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In this chapter, we take as our starting point Chris Brewster’s argument first put 
in 1995 that Europe presented a very different institutional environment for 
HRM from the USA and ask how far it still holds good two decades later.  
Brewster’s argument was that HRM would necessarily take a different form in 
Europe because the institutional environment was very different from the USA 
where the HRM approach originated. Managers were not as free to develop and 
apply HRM in Europe because they had less space to do so.  Norms, laws and 
institutions of collective employee voice (mainly trade unions and works 
councils) meshed together to constrain managers, but also provided them with 
distinctive opportunities to shape relations with employees.   
We conceptualise collective ‘employment relations’ in a way that is compatible 
with his argument.  The term implies above all a (power) relationship and we 
define it here as the joint regulation of employment between management and 
employee representative bodies.  Even the strongest jointly-regulated national 
systems of employment relations in Europe are best seen as a set of options for 
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managers and employees to negotiate the employment relationship’s terms.  
These options are taken in webs of interlocking legal, institutional, normative 
and circumstances.  Managers may prefer options that allow them more freedom 
to take decisions and they and their companies have sought greater autonomy, 
but choosing these can also incur costs arising from employee opposition or de-
motivation if the latter find them unacceptable. If the costs appear likely to be 
too high, managers are likely to avoid them.   
‘Employee representative bodies’ essentially means trade unions (one term for a 
very wide range of representative bodies) representing their members and works 
councils who represent all employees (again, in very different ways in different 
workplaces).  Throughout, we are concerned with the question of  how far 
managerial prerogative, that is the capacity of managers to decide matters 
unilaterally and without any element of joint regulation,  has increased across 
our period.  The extent of joint regulation in Europe appeared rather surprising 
to some American commentators in the 1990s.  In 1990, German co-
determination seemed to a US-based researcher to be a ‘highly-evolved 
instrument of industrial democracy’ (Havlovic, 1990), an assessment that might 
have seemed rather over-optimistic to some of those directly involved in it even 




When Brewster referred to ‘Europe’, he meant the European Union which then 
essentially comprised the countries of Western and Northern Europe.  In 1995, 
the ‘post-Soviet’ countries had only just begun their economic ‘transition’.  
Moreover, trade links between Western and East European countries 
geographically defined were much less well-developed than they are today.  
Despite recent assertions that a ‘new Cold War’ has begun, and without denying 
the great importance of recent developments in  the Ukraine, these economic 
links are now much better developed than in 1995.  In 1995, it was hard to 
imagine the domination of the Russian food and drinks market by foreign 
companies.   
 
We define Europe geographically and we therefore pay some attention to 
employment relations in the countries of Eastern Europe.  We include the huge 
area between the edge of the EU and the Urals: Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and 
Moldova which we designate the BRUM countries.  These countries developed 
links with Western industry even in Soviet times and in recent years, West 
European investments in Russia have grown still further (Russian Federation 
Statistical Service 2013).  There are many industrial links spanning a wide 
range of industries and countries.  Western car companies use Russian 
manufacturing facilities and the food industry in Russia is dominated by 
Western MNCs (Mihalev, 2012; Nestle, 2014). The cases of Ukraine and 
 4 
 
Moldova are rather different; in clothing (Moldova) and manufacturing 
(Ukraine), local companies supply finished and part-finished goods to Italian 
and German firms respectively while several other local industries also have 
strong links to the West (Ursu, 2013; Ukrstat 2014).  In the ex-Soviet 
manufacturing heartland of Belarus, Austrian companies have also made direct 
investments but here too the Netherlands, UK and Germany are significant 
direct investors (Belstat, 2013; Manenok, 2013).   Thus, this huge area is 
directly linked to the EU’s industrial centres both through considerable FDI and 
by organic manufacturing ties.  It provides an institutionally distinctive and 
much less employee-friendly model of employment relations that has become 
well-known to many West European companies over.  Productivity in these 
countries is similar to that in Eastern Europe but earnings are far lower (Piketty, 
2014).  Many millions of migrants from BRUM countries work in the West and 
carry with them distinctive norms concerning the employment relationship, 
heightening Westerners’ awareness of huge disparities in earnings and 
employment norms.   
The chapter is structured as follows.  We begin with a sketch of the situation in 
1995, and proceed by examining the evolution of national-level institutions 
across subsequent decades.   Next, we examine collective bargaining and social 
pacts at national level, following this with an assessment of the evolution of 
European-level institutions.  Finally, we briefly make a broad estimate of what 
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all of this meant for employment relations and especially management 
prerogative at workplace level.   
 
European employment relations in 1995 
In 1995, systems of collective employee representation were legally embedded 
at international (EU), national, regional and company levels.  The main 
institutions were trade unions which in many West European countries were and 
are involved in multi-employer negotiations about pay and terms and conditions 
more widely.  These often worked in tandem with works councils, workplace-
based bodies with rights to receive information, consult with management and 
‘co-determine’ certain issues (meaning that management must have works 
councillors’ agreement before making changes).  These organisations continue 
to operate, but generally speaking not in quite the same ways as in 1995 
(Arrowsmith and Puglignano,2014).   
In its ‘ideal type’, European employment relations took the following form.  At 
the EU level, trade unions (or ‘social partners’) had a role in the European 
Union’s structures where they could at least theoretically exert some political 
influence. At national level, similar arrangements also existed and these 
extended to some important areas of joint regulation such as training in 
Germany.  Collective bargaining on pay and conditions was conducted in large 
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companies and the public sector at either industry or company level.  Within 
companies, employee representatives were elected to supervisory boards and 
works councils exercising their co-determination rights.   
However, in Europe defined geographically this was only one of two systems.  
In ‘post-Socialist’ Europe, in the countries soon to join the European Union as 
‘accession countries’   and also in the BRUM nations very different systems 
existed.  In all of these countries, the employment relations situation was 
strongly marked by the Communist legacy.  The legal frameworks remained 
essentially those of soviet times, with strong labour codes which were only 
weakly observed while trade union structures and practices remained essentially 
those of Soviet times.  Privatisation had made limited progress, works councils 
did not exist and the majority ‘official’ (government-approved) unions were 
enterprise-level bodies with welfare and workforce-disciplining rather than 
bargaining functions.  A small group of ‘independent’ unions had begun to 
emerge in some countries but these remained an embattled minority restricted to 
a few industries and with limited influence throughout our period.  Through 
their national-level federations the official unions were involved in tripartite 
arrangements dubbed in Russia ‘social partnership’.  These arrangements were 
typical of Eastern Europe where elites used Tripartism to ease the transition.  It 
was a form according to David Ost (2000) of ‘illusory corporatism’ which 
integrated labour in the seismic changes then occurring in industry and society 
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without giving any substantial benefits to labour.  They were marked by token 
negotiation, non-binding agreements and exclusion of the private sector.   
Under ‘socialist’ regimes, managerial prerogative, subject not only to state but 
also to considerable informal worker challenge in large workplaces, was 
beginning to increase as systemic change and massive industrial disruption 
destroyed the bases of worker power (Morrison et al., 2012).    In the countries 
of Eastern Europe that were soon to join the EU, links developed with the EU 
unions through intensive training programmes which meant that although still 
marked by their history they gradually became broadly similar to their EU 
counterparts (Croucher and Rizov, 2012).  This was far from the case in the 
BRUM countries, where unions remained locked into their previous ossified 
structures and modes of operation.    
Thus, throughout the countries of Eastern Europe, a very different version of the 
‘European model’ existed in 1995; the unions’ institutional form was broadly 
similar to that in Western Europe but the content of their activity and the 
consequences of these for managers were quite different.  In Eastern countries, 
unions were structurally unable to exercise any significant representative 
function. Limited and fragmented but disruptive industrial actions from below 
occurred outside of the official union structures.   Since that point, the 
‘accession’ countries have entered the EU but the BRUM countries have not.   
 8 
 
Even in Western Europe, employee representative bodies have become weaker 
since 1995, reflecting many employees’ position in relation to employers caused 
by extensive industrial re-structuring, changing legal frameworks, increasingly 
‘flexible’ labour markets, seismic shifts in the nature of employment itself and 
the financial crisis.   
National laws and institutions 
National law and the norms and values that it embodies and reflects, continue to 
constitute the main framework governing collective relations between 
employers and employees throughout Europe.  An international index of the 
strength of nations’ employment laws and employees’ normative protection 
shows that European countries continued to vary greatly in the degree to which 
they restrict managerial prerogative ten years after Brewster wrote (Botero et al., 
(2004) but also that  European countries then had relatively high scores in world 
terms. Botero et.al.’s index, derived from a large sample of countries world-
wide ranked employee protection from 0(non-existent)-1(extremely high).  The 
global median is 0.4613.  Most European countries score above that.  Thus, 
Germany = 0.6071; Spain = 0.5863; Poland = 0.5655; Ukraine = 0.5774; 
Norway = 0.6488.  The high degree of de-regulation in the UK since the 1980s 
is shown by a rating of 0.1875, lower than the USA at 0.2589.  Despite an 
extension of trade union recognition rights in 1999, the general trend in the UK 
was towards a ‘bonfire’ of liberties, including collective labour rights under 
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New Labour (Ewing, 2010).  With this exception, Europe’s countries 
geographically defined did indeed have stronger collective employment laws 
than most other nations in 2003. Changes to these laws and their observation 
have only proceeded slowly in most countries.  How they are observed is of 
course a separate issue.   
In the BRUM countries, rhetorical commitment to ‘social partnership’ by the 
political and industrial elites sits uneasily with the harsh reality of employment 
relations, part of a picture causing many Moldovan workers to migrate not only 
to the EU but also to Russia.  Labour law in all these countries has been 
significantly revised since 1995 in ways that erode employee rights; the revised 
Russian Labour Code which came into force in 2002 is typical of the BRUM 
countries.  The revised code essentially shifts employment law on to an 
individual basis and greatly reduces all collective organisations’  legal functions 
(Rymkevitch, nd).  One expert in the area describes Russian employment law as 
‘totally disregarded’ in practice (Rymkevitch, nd: 4).        
Unions themselves have been shown to play a significant role in ensuring that 
employment law is enforced (Harcourt et.al., 2004).  Union density is also 
related to union influence on management defined more widely than simply 
enforcing employment law (Vernon, 2006).  European legal frameworks 
continue to support quite high density figures for many European countries 




vary greatly, from 74% of employees in Finland, 70% in Sweden and 67% in 
Denmark, to 10% in Estonia and Lithuania and 8% in France. The average level 
of union membership across the entire European Union, weighted by the 
numbers employed in the different member states, is 23%. The average is 
reduced by relatively low levels of membership in some larger EU countries: 
Spain at 19%, Germany at 18%, Poland with 12% and France at 8%.  
Membership in most countries is particularly strong in the public sector. In the 
private sector, membership is highest in larger companies. Yet union 
membership is not the only relevant indicator of strength, and French unions 
often show their ability to mobilise workers in large-scale strikes and 
demonstrations. 
If levels of union membership are generally high in global terms but also very 
varied within Europe, the direction in which they have moved since the mid-
1990s is relatively uniform. Only six states – Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, and Norway – have experienced gains in employed union 
membership in recent years. However, in most states, with the apparent 
exception of Italy, the increases have not kept pace with the overall growth in 
employment, meaning that even in these countries union density has drifted 
downwards.  Membership losses have been most marked in the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe, where industrial restructuring and a fundamental change in 
unions’ roles have had major impacts.  However, there are also signs of 
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membership stabilising in some of the countries as unions have responded by 
organising drives (all statistics from EIRO 2013).  Simultaneously, by 1999, 
coverage of collectively-bargained agreements had sunk to just 15% of 
enterprises even if these were by far the largest and most economically 
significant enterprises.  The result of this latter trend, which accelerated after the 
Hartz labour market reforms, was that Germany moved from having one of the 
smallest wage dispersions in Europe in the mid-1990s to having one of the 
largest today.  
Co-determination systems, within which employee representatives have the 
legal right to receive information, be consulted and ‘co-determine’ (or jointly 
regulate) certain issues with management, have also become rather weaker since 
1995.  In Germany, the heartland of co-determination, the system has become 
focused on larger companies.  Works councils must be requested by five or 
more employees, and employees in smaller companies have become 
increasingly reluctant to make requests.  A large ‘co-determination free zone’ 
has therefore emerged, centred on smaller companies and those based in the 
East.  Hence, since union membership fell simultaneously, the two main pillars 
of the German system (trade unionism outside of the workplace and co-
determination within it) were being eroded (Hassel, 1995).  These developments 
were typical of the situation in Western Europe more broadly. 
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Across Europe, trade unions made differential attempts to develop their internal 
organisation, increase their membership and improve their members’ living 
standards across the period, but these efforts have been very variable and 
strongly marked by their history (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013).  In 
some cases, West European unions simply relied on the institutional framework 
and took relatively passive approaches to declining membership.  Others 
worked hard by recruiting new groups of workers such as those in precarious 
employment.  The wider difficulties of adapting union organisations with strong 
cultures became evident across the two decades.  German unions for example 
were slow to adopt an ‘organising’ approach.  The historically powerful German 
engineering union IGMetall took some time to overcome their earlier stance that 
they would not give ‘legitimacy’ to certain types of worker by trying to recruit 
them (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013).  These difficulties of 
organisational adaptation led to the emergence of alternative institutions such as 
unofficial ‘grassroots’ representative employee networks to defend interests 
even in unionised German firms such as Siemens (Croucher et al., 2007).  In 
short, European unions and especially those supported by relatively strong legal 
and institutional frameworks have proved organisations whose structures, 
orientations and cultures have frequently proved difficult to shift in response to 
external conditions.   
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It is not only trade unions that have had to change to adapt to changed 
environments and employers’ demands for increased autonomy.  So, too have 
employers’ associations, but Traxler (2004) argued that they have made more 
consistent efforts to adapt to external conditions.  Employers’ associations are 
an integral part of systems that impose certain disciplines on firms by, for 
example, being responsible together with unions for upholding collective 
agreements where wage bargaining occurs across industries.  They often 
therefore appear to employers to be part of a union support ecosystem.  
Nevertheless, employers’ associations offer important advantages to some 
companies in ensuring strong employer-employer links, capacity to pressure 
government, training and advice services and so on.  One important cause of the 
decline in industry-wide collective bargaining coverage in Germany has 
therefore been the growth of employer association membership ‘ohne Tarif’, in 
other words without the need to adhere to the industry-wide bargain.  In this 
way, employers’ associations have been able to stabilise their membership 
levels whilst re-shaping collective bargaining as a more single-company based 
activity (Helfen, 2011).   
 
The extension of industry-wide bargaining has long been a demand of  unions in 
the accession countries but this has made little or no progress and this is one 
reason why Employer’s Associations remain weak in that part of Europe.  
Employers Associations in BRUM countries have always been weak, reflecting 
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their minimal employment relations roles. All of the ‘post-socialist’ countries 
lack solid legal bases for such associations and, where they exist, they lack the 
capacity to engage in sectoral dialogue (Muller, 2005).   
   
Overall, we can conclude that trade unions, works councils and employers’ 
associations have all had either diminished or at least different roles since 1995.  
The interlocking institutional systems that historically constrained managers in 
1995 have become somewhat looser, especially in the case of smaller 
companies (Silvia, 1997).  Larger companies remain relatively well-integrated 
into these arrangements although the systems themselves have also become 
more flexible.    
National-level collective bargaining and social pacts  
Both national legal provisions on the status of collective agreements and the 
institutions of collective employee voice may act to limit managerial 
prerogative in the key area of employee reward.  Countries fall into two main 
categories in this respect.  The first is those where industrial-level bargaining on 
wages and benefits is the norm; this important group includes Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The second smaller 
group includes the UK, France, Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania.  Here, 
wage bargaining is predominantly decentralised to company level.  In the EU 
accession countries of Eastern Europe and the BRUM nations, company-level 
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bargaining predominates.  Thus, bargaining and arguably trade unionism in 
Western Europe are both moving in the BRUM direction.  The general trend 
even where industry-level bargaining is widespread has been towards allowing 
flexibility to companies within the industrial bargain through, for example 
‘opening clauses’ in industry agreements which allow works councils to modify 
them.  Since the financial crisis, there has also been a marked trend towards 
diminishing legal support for industry bargaining, especially in the states of 
Southern Europe (Clauwaert and Schömann 2012).    
Social pacts and tripartite structures have played a considerable role in national 
employment policy and wage setting in several EU countries since the mid-
1990s, outside of the liberal market economy of Britain where tripartism no 
longer exists.  In Germany, corporatist relations between trade unions, 
employers’ associations at national level have played a major role in two 
respects since the mid-1990s.  First, the Hartz labour market reforms under 
Schröder stimulated the creation of a large number of ‘mini-jobs’ with reduced 
hours and often low pay; the growth of such jobs has recently led to the decision 
to create a national minimum wage previously thought unnecessary.  Second, in 
the sizeable part of the economy by employment where collective bargaining 
remains important and large exporting companies operate, wages have been 
kept under firm control through tripartite integration of the unions into 
governmental perspectives.  This has ensured that German products remain 
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competitive on cost as well as quality grounds.  Broadly similar pacts operated 
in several other European countries including Ireland, contributing to the 
success of the Irish economy prior to the financial crisis.  In both Germany and 
Ireland, albeit for very different reasons, real earnings have diminished in recent 
years, generating a sentiment that collective bargaining has been ineffective in 
defending workers.  In Southern Europe, a similar trend accelerated 
dramatically with the financial crisis.  In these countries, the state has played an 
increasingly interventionist role in employment relations.  This has tended to 
undermine and even usurp trade unions’ independent roles as bargaining agents 
and remove their capacity to defend living standards from serious damage has 
hit union membership (Molina, 2014).    
 
In Russia, tripartite ‘social partnership’ arrangements have existed since early in 
‘transition’ and constitute a coercive form of corporatism which has served to 
marginalise unions’ bargaining roles since unions can survive as government- 
and company-sponsored institutions.  ‘Social partnership’ has buttressed the 
position of the largely Soviet-style trade unionism of the ‘official’ trade unions 
in the FNPR at the expense of the ‘independent’ unions at enterprise as well as 
at national level.  The Global Union Federations devoted considerable resources 
between 1995 and 2005 to attempting to reform the official unions in the 
BRUM countries, trying to transform them into genuine bargaining 
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organisations.  Although they had some limited success (Croucher, 2004) these 
unions currently remain largely locked into ‘social partnership’ mode.  The 
influence of unions on management in the Eastern European EU accession 
countries has been shown to be real if small (Croucher and Rizov 2012); that in 
the BRUM countries is, overall, still smaller although not entirely absent 
(Croucher, 2011; Morrison et al 2011).  Limited unofficial conflict has emerged 
through strikes and employee networks in the West European car companies 
located in St Petersburg, but generally Western managements have been able to 
use plants located BRUM countries as part of a ‘coercive comparison’ strategy 
with which to control their Western unions.  The more optimistic accounts of 
East European unions relations within European MNEs focus on accession 
countries where EU membership encourages unions to see themselves as part of 
an EU-wide union movement (see most recently Lee and Trappmann 2014).             
The European level: institutionalising ‘social dialogue’? 
Although the content of trade unionism in the EU is more positive for workers 
than in the BRUM countries, the results of ‘social dialogue’ within the EU are 
only slightly more tangible than those of its equivalent in Russia.  The EU is a 
distinctive regional organisation. In contrast to the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA), it embodies an aspiration towards political union and a 
distinctive vision of good quality employment and ‘social dialogue’ (on 
NAFTA’s labour clause, its consequences, making a comparison with Europe 
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see Ozarow 2013).  The EU has itself been concerned to develop European-
level institutions involving the ‘social partners’ as one way of developing a 
transnational European identity; in this section we examine the very restricted 
effects of these efforts on managerial prerogative since 1995. 
Importantly, the EU has in practice no capacity to legislate on fundamental 
trade union rights, which is a matter for the national level.  Its employment 
initiatives have sought to develop the internal market and to ensure its 
efficiency. The EU has issued numerous directives relevant to employment 
relations since the Maastricht Treaty which introduced European Monetary 
Union.  These directives, which were linked to the accession of the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe who were felt to lack many aspects of the West 
European model, occurred between 1993 and 2004 and there have been 
relatively few such measures since their accession.  The directives covered 
working time (1993 and 2003), European Works Councils (1994), European 
Companies (2001), non-discrimination (2001), national level information and 
consultation of employee representatives (2002), European co-operatives (2002), 
gender equality (2004) and the movement of workers (2004).  All of these 
measures were then transposed into national law.  The transposition process was 
very uneven between countries and the original directives were applied in very 
different ways. This gave rise to what some authorities called a ‘world of dead 
letters’ characterised by politicised and formal transposition linked to non-
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compliance in practice. That ‘world’ included the new member states of Central 
and Eastern Europe, but also encompassed at least two countries from among 
the original EU-15.  Thus, pseudo-compliance was modelled by the new entrant 
states but some other countries acted in similar ways (Falkner and Treib, 2008).  
The resultant national legislation impacted the institutional framework and even 
changed and informed management practice, but only to a very limited extent.  
To take just one important area, the impact of the information and consultation 
directive requiring companies to have mechanisms for informing and consulting 
employees: the main British authority on the law estimated that it had only 
marginal results at company level (Hall et.al., 2013).        
 
Perhaps the most important EU initiative in an institutional sense was the 
European Works Councils Directive.  This encouraged sizeable companies 
employing workers in different European countries to establish information and 
consultation bodies for elected employee representatives. In effect it attempted 
to transpose a weak (because it contained no element of joint regulation or ‘co-
determination’) form of German consultation law to the European level.  Thus, 
the German unions emphasised that it gave employee representatives no legal 
powers to put pressure on management.  A considerable group of companies 
based in the UK and the USA have not established EWCs at all, but where they 
have there is evidence that under certain circumstances including pre-existing 
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solid industrial relations and cohesive worker representation they have had 
some impact on management decision-making (Marginson et.al., 2004).  
However, while a minority function well, experts estimate that a majority are 
less effective (Hall et.al., 2013).  One reason for this has been the relatively 
weak integration of employee representatives from Eastern Europe and 
especially of those from outside the EU (Stirling and Tully, 2004).  Meardi 
(2004) argues that employee representatives from the accession countries tend 
to ‘short circuit’ the EWC’s co-ordinating function by using the opportunity to 
access Western headquarters management directly.   
EU action in employment relations also encouraged dialogue between the 
‘social partners’ (trade unions and employers associations) to conduct ‘sectoral 
social dialogue’.   Léonard (2008) correctly points out that this is a top-down 
institution where institutionalization has preceded action.  Consequently, it has 
only limited scope to impact employment relations at workplace level.  She 
argues that it calls the EU’s capacity to assist in the creation of a viable EU 
system of employment relations into question.  Prosser (2006) further shows 
that uneven and limited implementation of ‘sectoral dialogue’ decisions mean 
that despite attempts to intensify it, the effects on managerial prerogative have 
been negligible.   Rather, strong national unions remain the drivers of 
international union co-ordination (Schroeder and Weinert, 2004).    
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According to one influential account, unions are helping develop a European 
industrial/political space and addressing the EU’s democratic deficit by 
influencing industrial policy (Erne, 2008).  This ‘Euro-democratisation’ thesis 
rests however on an analysis of one case albeit one of considerable European 
significance.  It appears to show that there is some scope within the EU for 
unions, where they are exceptionally well co-ordinated, to influence industrial 
policy at European level.  In the case analysed by Roland Erne, this had 
considerable impact on management industrial strategy.    
 
There has also been the gradual and uneven creation of an area that was 
relatively weakly developed when Brewster wrote in the mid-1990s.  
Developments in co-ordinated collective bargaining in historically well-
organised industries such as metalworking, and in consultation through 
European Works Councils between unions and employers’ associations has 
been an element in developing (West) European employment relations since 
1995 (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; Edwards et al, 2006; Léonard 2008).  
Overall, while there have been significant developments at this level they are 
fragmented and partial, heavily impacted by the financial crisis and have had 
little effect on managerial prerogative.   
In the BRUM countries, tensions have played out between EU and post-soviet 
forms of trade unionism and labour management.  Up until the Global Union 
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Federations’ abandonment of their attempts to reform unions in Belarus 
following Lukashenko’s election as President, prospects for a more 
representative and bargaining-oriented trade unionism throughout the region 
appeared reasonably good.  From that point onwards, they diminished almost to 
vanishing point.  Belarus looked increasingly to Russian and Chinese 
investment and political models, while Putin tightened his political grip in 
Russia via a xenophobic nationalism that alienated many migrant workers from 
Moldova and Central Asia.  In 2014 Russia extended its influence into 
Ukraine’s East, the home of its heavy industry and much of its trade unionism.  
In Belarus, trade unions became a constraint on managements because they 
adopted a surveillance role for the state and not because they represented 
workers (Danilovich and Croucher, 2011).  Thus, the prospects of union reform 
in the region diminished dramatically.  So, too, did the political possibilities of 
EU-based unions making positive links to their colleagues in the BRUM 
countries with a view to making collective cause in relation to MNEs.   
Employment relations at workplace level 
We now attempt a necessarily very broad and brief estimate of continuity and 
change in European employment relations in workplaces and how they have 
affected managerial prerogative since 1995.  At a very general level, 
employment relations remain distinctive in comparison with those in the USA.  
HR managers in large companies in continental Western Europe still deal with 
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employee representatives from day-to-day, settling a wide range of relatively 
small-scale issues which works councillors are legally entitled to raise.  
Managers in these countries also continue to make pragmatic use of trade 
unions and works councils as communications channels to workforces, since 
unionised workforces tend to remain more sceptical of management information 
than their non-unionised equivalents.  At the same time, and especially in the 
UK and Ireland, there has also been growth in employer-driven ‘employee voice’ 
mechanisms such as ‘company councils’ as managers attempt to get the benefits 
of employee voice without allowing reducing their prerogative (Gollan and 
Perkins, 2009).  In the EU ‘accession countries’, union representatives have 
some influence on managers, especially in older, state-controlled industrial 
companies where workers feel relatively secure (Croucher and Rizov 2012).  In 
the BRUM countries, managers continue to enjoy much greater and almost 
unrestricted power in relation both to employees and trade unions.  This is 
reflected in the formal legally-mandated collective agreements that specify 
employees’ terms and conditions; few are genuinely negotiated.  This level of 
managerial power also probably underlies declining employee willingness of 
Russian employees to make extra discretionary effort since the mid-1990s 
(Croucher and Rizov, 2011).  Managers in Ukraine tend to make exclusive use 
of the soviet-legacy and legally-recognised general meeting of employees (‘the 
assembly of the working collective’) for communicating with workers, in 
preference to using often ossified union structures (Croucher, 2010).  
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Throughout Europe, the consequences of the ongoing financial crisis have 
clearly been very material especially in workplaces in the Mediterranean 
countries most severely affected, but as yet very little systematic research has 
appeared on that subject (for a partial exception see Molina, 2014).   
Conclusion 
The gradual erosion of the collective institutions that shaped managerial choices 
in the second half of the 20
th
 Century has widened managerial prerogative at 
workplace level since 1995, albeit in uneven ways.  Nevertheless, the content 
and processes of employment relations in many large West European companies 
in 2015 would be entirely recognisable to the practitioners of two decades 
previously.   
Indeed, it was already being argued in 1995 that a process of ‘organised 
decentralisation’ whereby states ensured that decentralised company-level 
bargaining proceeded in an orchestrated fashion was underway.  This increased 
managements’ scope for action whilst leaving systemic features otherwise intact 
(Traxler, 1995).  One recent analysis of collective bargaining in densely-
unionised Denmark provides a good example of this in practice.  Ilsøe (2012) 
found that bargaining at enterprise level was indeed essentially intact.  She also 
speculated that the future might bring change because of the difficulties posed 
in smaller companies where managers and employees alike had less 
involvement than in their larger counterparts.  However, others have offered 
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quite different and in a sense contrary prognoses.  Haipeter (2011) argues that 
the changes in the German system are not simply signs of erosion but on closer 
examination actually offer new bargaining possibilities for both unions and 
employers associations albeit in novel directions.   The contrast between the two 
viewpoints illustrates both the unevenness of the current situation and the acute 
difficulty involved in forecasting future developments.    
The pressures are evident, but we have drawn attention to one that is often 
ignored. We have argued that there is not one model of employment relations in 
Europe but at least two; the BRUM countries represent a completely different 
and much less employee-friendly model on the EU’s borders. The BRUM 
model is well-known to many West European companies especially those in 
industries such as clothing, the automotive industries and food where much 
manufacturing is conducted in the BRUM countries.  This constitutes an 
additional pressure on the (EU) ‘European’ model.     
 
Nevertheless, the demise of the European system analysed by Brewster in 1995 
has not occurred despite real pressures upon it and the minimal efforts made by 
the EU to defend it.  There is a considerable degree of national ‘path 
dependence’ in institutional employment relations in the countries of Europe.   
Perhaps the last word should be given to the American researchers  Crossland 
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and Hambrick (2011), who recently argued that managers of US-based firms 
still have more latitude than their counterparts in many European countries. 
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*Brewster’s argument in 1995 that Europe requires a different approach to 
HRM from the approaches used in the USA continues to have force because the 
institutional framework in Europe remains distinctive twenty years later.   
*The power of union and works council representatives to influence 
management decisions affecting employees has nevertheless diminished since 
1995.  Managements in large companies make pragmatic use of employee 
representation for communications purposes.  
*The coverage of collective bargaining and co-determination within the EU has 
diminished.   
*The effects of EU law-making have played a real but minor role in maintaining 
the strength of European worker representation; strong national unions have led 
European inter-union co-ordination.   
*There is not one ‘European model’ but at least two.  An Eastern model based 
in the countries of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova has only changed in 
minor ways since 1995.  Only some of the unions in these countries have moved 
significantly towards representation and bargaining.  Employment relations in 
these countries constitute an alternative, less employee-friendly model well-
known to some Western companies.    
*The financial crisis is clearly affecting employee representation negatively but 
it is hard to specify the effects in detail yet.    
